The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory

Abstract

The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory† T. M. SCANLON T. M. SCANLON *Department of Philosophy, Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar † A revised venion of a paper presented as the Hart Lecture in Jurisprudence and Moral Philosophy at University College, Oxford, on 24 May 1990. It was a great pleasure to give a lecture in honour of Herbert Hart, from whose writings, especially The Concept of Law and Punishment and Responsibility, I have learned, and continue to learn, so much. I am also grateful to Professor Hart for his comments after the lecture, which led me to rethink the relation between Bernard Williams's position and my own. I have tried to respond to his questions in this revised version, but I am not certain that I have fully met his points. In making my revisions I have also had the aid of helpful comments from a number of others who were present at the original lecture. I am indebted to them and also to Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, Samuel Schefner, and the members of the Society for Ethical and Legal Philsophy for comments on later drafts. I would also like to thank the Guggenheim Foundation for its support and the Senior Common Room of University College, Oxford, for its hospitality while I was working on this paper. Author Notes Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, Spring 1992, Pages 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/12.1.1 Published: 01 March 1992