Abstract
ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to find out if Michael Smith's version of the causal theory of action is able to solve David Velleman's agency par excellence challenge. Smith (2012) has claimed that his theory can deal with the challenge insofar as the exercise of the capacity to be instrumentally rational plays the intermediating role which Velleman (1992a) thinks of the agent as playing in the causation of action. However, I argue Smith misunderstands the challenge at hand, thereby failing to find the agent's proper role in action explanation. Moreover, I claim Velleman's objection puts Smith's account of the causal theory in trouble by showing it cannot reconcile the causal explanation of intentional action with our ordinary conception of agency. If Smith intends to explain what a 'full-blooded' intentional action is, I then believe he needs to incorporate into his theory a more robust account of rational guidance.
Highlights
Michael Smith (2004, p. 156) has argued that the Humean story of motivation gives rise to what is widely known in action theory as the causal theory of action (CTA).2 Generally speaking, the idea behind CTA is that actions are caused by some desire the agent has and by some belief that she needs to do such and such in order to achieve the intended desire, which jointly cause the relevant behavior in her body
I think that the claim behind the agency par excellence is that reconciling the causal explanation of intentional action with our ordinary conception of agency will be possible only if causal theories can explain how agents are guided by their reasons as well
I defend the idea that the agency par excellence challenge puts Smith’s account of action in trouble by showing it cannot reconcile the causal explanation of intentional action with our ordinary conception of agency
Summary
Michael Smith (2004, p. 156) has argued that the Humean story of motivation gives rise to what is widely known in action theory as the causal theory of action (CTA). Generally speaking, the idea behind CTA is that actions are caused by some desire the agent has and by some belief that she needs to do such and such in order to achieve the intended desire, which jointly cause the relevant behavior in her body. 309-12) have forcefully claimed that the causal theory faces the problem of finding no place for the agent in the explanatory order of the world.. 309-12) have forcefully claimed that the causal theory faces the problem of finding no place for the agent in the explanatory order of the world.3 They have held that it omits the agent’s participation from the history of her action. Smith thinks that when the agent exercises his capacity to be instrumentally rational, he is playing his intermediating role in action explanation. I shall describe Velleman’s objection to CTA (section 2) and sketch Smith’s reply to it (section 3). I shall offer an alternative reading of the agency par excellence challenge (section 4) and so argue that Velleman’s challenge puts Smith’s account of action in trouble (section 5)
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