The Agency of the Other and the Question of Violence: Otherwise than Levinas

Abstract

It is well known that Emmanuel Levinas places the ‘other’ at the heart of his phenomenology, as an agency the relation toward which constitutes subjectivity. As such, the Levinasian other is deprived of violence, and it is identified with the figures of the foreigner, the orphan, and the widow. The only resistance the other could muster against the violence directed at him/ her, argues Levinas, is what he terms as the resistance of lack of resistance. This article aims at questioning this premise. Is the other indeed deprived of any violence? The readings of Derrida, Sartre, Foucault, Agamben, Freud, and Lacan can prove otherwise: either the other is equipped with contingent violence, in accordance with its intentions, as Derrida argues; or it is equipped with a priori violence, administered through the gaze, as Sartre shows. The violence of the other is linked to the violence of identity, as that which alienates the self from itself by depriving it of its fluctuating heterogeneity, whatever name it assumes.