Abstract

Abstract Established as a multilateral development bank (MDB) funded by African states, the African Development Bank (AfDB) is one of many similar international organizations (IO s) comprising the development finance regime complex. Arguably, states and policy elites recreate similar IO s that enable “norm conformance” within the complex. This is demonstrated through the AfDB’s adoption of the Independent Recourse Mechanism (IRM) in 2004. Despite no need or demand, the relatively insulated AfDB agreed to provide recourse for people adversely affected by AfDB-financed projects. This article argues that consensus among state and nonstate actors around an accountability policy norm led the AfDB to conform. Nonregional Member States, particularly the United States, used typical norm diffusion mechanisms: financial incentives, normative suasion, and voting on the AfDB’s Board. The concept of norm conformance highlights how behavioral expectations and organizational practices change based on what is socially appropriate.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call