The Afghanistan Task Force and Prime Ministerial Leadership: Tactical Retreat or a New Direction in Managing Canadian Foreign Policy?

Abstract

It has been assumed that since inheriting Martin’s decision to send 2000 soldiers to Kandahar, Stephen Harper has maintained control over all aspects of the Afghanistan mission. Donald Savoie and others have made the argument that the Prime Minister and his advisors have dominated and centralized the policymaking process while relegating other institutional players to a secondary role. This article challenges this image and suggests a more nuanced picture of the relationship between Harper and the bureaucracy. With the foundering of the Afghan mission, the government created the Afghanistan Task Force (ATF) and bent the rules of engagement to break down the barriers of “departmentalism.” For Harper it was a matter of political survival; for the Privy Council Office (PCO) it was an opportunity to maximize its influence. By 2008 a new generation of mandarins in the ATF were sharing the foreign policymaking platform with key players in the executive branch of government. In the process Harper’s command over foreign policy has been challenged as new approaches to rapid civilian–military responses are sought.