The Afghan Refugees: Hostages in the Struggle for power

Abstract

Despite widespread expectations the Kabul regime did not collapse after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in February 1989. Instead the regime has strengthened itself both militarily and politically; and the process of national reconciliation, even though it has failed to end the civil war, has nevertheless significantly broadened the support base of Najibullah's government. The muja-hiddin, by contrast, have failed to pose a credible military challenge to Kabul; and the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) is politically fragmented and has been unable to rid itself of external control. In the changed international system the external backers of the AIG are distancing themselves. The US assistance has dwindled; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are preoccupied and Pakistan's enthusiasm for the mujahiddin also appears to have largely evaporated. Faced with diplomatic isolation, and militarily marginalized, the AIG is now using the large number of refugees in Pakistan to bring political pressure on Kabul. Some of the humanitarian agencies, albeit unwittingly, are also obstructing the return of the refugees. However, AIG's ability to hold the refugees as ‘hostages’ is limited. War in Afghanistan is now confined to a few strategic areas and the refugees are now beginning to return home to what the UN has termed as ’zones of tranquillity‘. Nearly a third of the refugees may have already returned. Is it the beginning of the end?