The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 and the Crime Suspect's Right of Silence: A Clog in the Wheels of Justice?

Abstract

This paper seeks to examine whether the application of the right of silence by a crime suspect as provided for under section 6 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 constitutes an encumbrance to the speedy dispensation of justice. Term ‘crime suspect’ refers to a person who (a) has been suspected of committing an act or omission, expressly proscribed by the law, and (b) this person is yet to be charged for the suspected act or omission committed. The right of silence is encompassed in the right to be presumed innocent and the privilege against self-incrimination which is expressed in the Latin maxim ‘nemo tenetur seipsum prodere’. The right of silence can be exercised either at the pre-trial stage or during the trial. The right of silence being examined in this paper is that exercised by the crime suspect at the pre-trial (investigation) stage, and not during trial being that the ‘crime suspect’ becomes an accused (or defendant) once charged with the offence, and hence, the right of silence exercised at that stage might fall under the trial stage. The paper finds that the exercise of the right of silence by the crime suspect at the pre-trial stage, as provided for under section 6 of the ACJA 2015, does not constitute a clog in the wheels of the Nigerian criminal justice system being that firstly the right is not absolute, as it terminates once the crime suspect has consulted with the legal practitioner or person of choice. Secondly, the crime suspect is mandated to give statement after this consultation.