Abstract
As an institution competent both for central banking and banking supervision, the ECB is ideally equipped to monitor macroprudential risks. However, despite an overhaul of the European framework following the Great Financial Crisis, the ECB has remained assigned to a secondary or subsidiary role, largely dependent on the actions or lack thereof from the national competent authorities. After having presented the various tools at the ECB’s disposal to deal with macroprudential risks, this article critically assesses how and to what extent the Frankfurt-based institution should be held accountable in that field.
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