Abstract

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian]
 The absolute pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although successful, were abandoned, so current theories, although successful, will also be abandoned. By contrast, the relative pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although superior to their predecessors, were discarded, so current theories, although superior to earlier theories, will also be discarded. Some pessimists would have us believe that the relative pessimistic induction avoids empirical progressivism. I argue, however, that it has the same problem as the absolute pessimistic induction, viz., either its premise is implausible or its conclusion does not probably follow from its premise.

Highlights

  • The pessimistic induction (PI) asserts that “we are in the midst of an ongoing historical process in which our theoretical conceptions of nature will continue to change just as profoundly and fundamentally as they have in the past” (Stanford 2015: 875)

  • It appears that empirical progressivism nullifies the absolute pessimistic induction (API), but not the relative pessimistic induction (RPI), and that the RPI is better than the API

  • The API says that earlier theories, successful, were overthrown, so current theories, successful, will be overthrown

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Summary

Introduction

The pessimistic induction (PI) asserts that “we are in the midst of an ongoing historical process in which our theoretical conceptions of nature will continue to change just as profoundly and fundamentally as they have in the past” (Stanford 2015: 875). K. Brad Wray (2013) and Mario Alai (2017) contend that current theories, more successful than their predecessors, will suffer the same fate. Brad Wray (2013) and Mario Alai (2017) contend that current theories, more successful than their predecessors, will suffer the same fate To justify this contention, they have constructed a new PI, which I call the relative pessimistic induction (RPI). This paper, aims to show that neither the API nor the RPI is cogent Achieving this aim does not count as establishing scientific realism. Establishing scientific realism requires refuting the two PIs, and constructing positive arguments for it. It will become clear that given how science has developed, pessimists cannot achieve both a plausible premise and a conclusion that is made probable by that premise

The Absolute and Relative Pessimistic Inductions
Against the API
Against the RPI
Implication for Selectivism
Objections and Replies
Scientists’ Capability
General Relativity and Quantum Theory
Müller’s Objection
Conclusion
Findings
Cambridge
Full Text
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