Abstract
A continued deficit in NATO’s ability to provide permanent security wherever and whenever the allied states’ political interests demand may result in the Alliance failing to maintain internal cohesion and to deter potential geopolitical adversaries. This aspect, constantly hoped for and speculated by the Russian Federation, starting with the resumption of the offensive at the beginning of the 21st century, especially after the annexation of Crimea, has led to a proper dosage of the ingredients that laid the foundation of the A2/AD concept. Understanding the role A2/AD plays in Russia’s doctrinal thinking is as critical as allocating the resources to counter it. A full change in Russia’s strategy in this regard for the Black Sea region is very unlikely, especially after the interdiction capabilities have reached a satisfactory level of operationalization and remain the only ones that guarantee optimal control of the maritime area, thus making it possible to continue ground operations in Ukraine.
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