The 9/11 Commission and Disaster Management: Little Depth, Less Context, Not Much Guidance

Abstract

The 9-11 Commission Report was considered for the National Book Award, both for the style in which it was written and for the manner in which the report provides crucial background information and puts the events of September 11, 2001 into a broader historical and policy context. My colleagues have said much the same thing in this review symposium. While that may be true for other parts of the report, such a perspective is missing from Chapter 9 Heroism and Horror, the section on the emergency response following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The report glosses over or ignores entirely factors that are key to the public's understanding of the emergency response on September 11. Focusing on the World Trade Center, for example, while Chapter 9 begins with the observation that Emergency response is a product of the chapter provides little information on the status of preparedness activities in New York at the time of the Trade Center attacks. When preparations by individual agencies such as the Port Authority and NYPD are discussed, the discussions center on details such as authority relationships within those agencies, radio frequencies used, and equipment. The authors do not address more important dimensions of emergency preparedness, such as the existence or quality of agency and interagency plans, previous citywide preparedness drills and exercises, special training first responders may have received, pre-existing mutual aid agreements among agencies or jurisdictions (or lack thereof), or other types of preparedness activities. Nor is there any real attempt to relate how agencies responded on September 11 to prior preparedness efforts. With respect to broader factors affecting preparedness, the report likewise ignores the fact that New York City, while at risk from terrorist attacks, is not particularly disasterprone and, except for the 1993 Trade Center bombing, had not faced a major event requiring a large-scale multiagency response in decades. New York can be contrasted with Los Angeles, which has extensive experience meeting the challenges associated with earthquakes, fires, and other major communitywide crises. The City had been carrying out regular drills focusing on different aspects of