Abstract

The Brazilian party system presents a paradox. Although the Workers Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) have controlled presidential elections for the last 20 years, their force at the other levels of electoral competition has not grown. The objective of this study is to undertake a discussion of this situation through the 2014 general elections. After attempting to explain why successive challengers have not been able to change the structure of competition for the Brazilian presidency, I will analyze the relation established between the pattern observed at this level and the other “connected” electoral disputes—both those for state executive and federal legislative office. The general conclusion is that even if the pattern continues, it is quite improbable that this will significantly impact the other levels of national political party competition.

Highlights

  • The Brazilian party system presents a paradox

  • The objective of this study is to use the 2014 general elections to undertake the discussion about the Brazilian political party system

  • We focus on state level politics to discuss the prospects for "presidentialization" of the elections for governor

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Summary

Carlos Ranulfo Melo

The Brazilian party system presents a paradox. the Workers Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) have controlled presidential elections for the last 20 years, their force at the other levels of electoral competition has not grown. They elected 24.1% of city mayors in 2012, and in 2015, they managed to control 19.4%, 24.1%, 22.2% and 37.0% of the seats in the state legislative assemblies, the federal Chamber of Deputies, the Federal Senate, and of state governorships, respectively Beginning with this description, the objective of this study is to use the 2014 general elections to undertake the discussion about the Brazilian political party system. Presidential elections and the third way It is generally known (COX, 1997; DUVERGER, 1987) that majority disputes reduce the number of competitors effectively, either because the "entry cost" of the dispute is high and parties may prefer other strategies to obtain political advantage, or because the electorate tends to choose from among those who possess a greater chance of winning This does not define who these competitors will be, whether the situation will stabilize or if, on the contrary, during each election the "effective" competitors will vary.

Effective number of candidates
Mayors Council Members
PSD PP PSB DEM SD PPS PSDB
Findings
Conclusion
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