Abstract
BackgroundFamine early warning systems clearly identified the risk of famine in South Central Somalia in 2010–2011 but timely action to prevent the onset of famine was not taken. The result was large scale mortality, morbidity, and population displacement.DiscussionThe main factor that turned a drought-related food crisis into a famine was the war that afflicted southern Somalia and the tactics adopted by the various belligerents. These included non-state actors, regional, and international governments. In disasters and complex emergencies, such as this, we posit that five conditions need to be in place to enable humanitarian agencies to provide a timely response to early warnings of famine. These are: presence; access; adequate funding; operational capacity; and legal protection for humanitarian action. In the run up to the Somalia famine each of these presented severe challenges to humanitarian action. The design of the current coordination and funding system contributed to the problems of achieving a neutral, independent, and effective humanitarian response.SummaryThe 2011 famine in Somalia was predicted and could have been mitigated or prevented if the humanitarian response had been timely and more effective. To improve responsiveness to early warnings, action is required to better insulate the humanitarian system from political agendas. While overcoming constraints, such as lack of access, may sometimes be beyond the scope of humanitarian actors, more could be done to enhance the perceived neutrality of parts of the humanitarian system. This should include a reappraisal of the cluster coordination system and reforms to donor funding mechanisms.
Highlights
Famine early warning systems clearly identified the risk of famine in South Central Somalia in 2010– 2011 but timely action to prevent the onset of famine was not taken
The media focussed on drought as the main cause, the 2011 Somalia famine was caused by multiple factors that included conflict, the use of anti-terrorism legislation by the United States (US) government to prevent aid reaching Southern Somalia
Agencies failed to collectively adapt to World Food Programme (WFP)’s absence from South Central Somalia: contingency plans were not developed despite the collapse in presence and operational capacity that this represented [5], and WFP remained the provider of last resort despite its questionable ability to perform this role whilst operationally absent from the areas most at risk
Summary
Analysis of the response We posit that five conditions need to be in place for a timely response to early warnings by humanitarian agencies These are: presence; access; adequate funding; operational capacity; and legal protection for humanitarian action. Association with western donors made it dangerous for agencies to maintain operational capacity in al Shabaab controlled areas and made al Shabaab’s decision to ban WFP and 16 other UN agencies and international NGOs more likely. Agencies failed to collectively adapt to WFP’s absence from South Central Somalia: contingency plans were not developed despite the collapse in presence and operational capacity that this represented [5], and WFP remained the provider of last resort despite its questionable ability to perform this role whilst operationally absent from the areas most at risk. It is no surprise that those agencies operating largely outside of the cluster system maintained the greatest access
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