The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: A Retrospective Study in American Ambivalence

Abstract

Scholars, experts, and journalists alike typically view the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis as an example of successful American intervention. However, this is an imperfect depiction of the events that transpired. Through new evidence leading up to, during, and following the crisis, this article argues that the Clinton administration was more ambivalent towards Taiwan and conciliatory towards China than commonly portrayed, and that this approach reflects a consistent, broader strategy present throughout this overarching time period. Following a summary of the crisis itself and the administration’s public posture surrounding it, the article delves into internal documents to both corroborate and build on its argument, arguing that these characteristics can be explained by the administration’s frustrations with Taipei during this time. It concludes by pointing to broader implications, questioning the effectiveness of the Clinton administration’s stance, noting that it helped establish non-military norms limiting U.S. support for Taiwan, and exemplifying the validity of a longer timeframe in critically analyzing crises.