The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Need for Change

Abstract

Abstract : In the early 197Os, amidst a world order predominantly defined by the Cold War relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, both nations agreed that then- strategic security would be best served by deterrence based on mutual vulnerability to nuclear ballistic missile attack Thus, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) became the prevailing strategic arrangement -- a long-term, ultra-high stakes US-Soviet standoff backed by massive nuclear arsenals land sealed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, more aptly thought of as an anti-ABM treaty. The fact that the Cold War never became hot may suggest that MAD was right for the time, but the post-Cold War strategic setting has made the 1972 ABM Treaty a relic that is no longer valid. In fact, continued adherence to the treaty, based as it is on the Cold War mind set that strategic deterrence and strategic defense are mutually exclusive, is progressively undermining the security of the US which the treaty was originally intended to preserve. To remedy this, the US must do nothing less than press ahead with the development and deployment of a limited national ABM capability and, accordingly, seek to significantly modify the 1972 ABM treaty in conjunction with Russia to achieve a strategic deterrence-defense mix that is essential for today's world context.