The 1959 Moroccan oil poisoning and US Cold War disaster diplomacy

Abstract

This article explores the ways in which Cold War publicity concerns shaped American humanitarian efforts in Morocco, examining responses to the 1959 cooking oil adulteration in light of Kenneth Osgood's work on American Cold War public relations, as well as the work of analysts of more recent ‘disaster diplomacy’. The Cold War provided an incentive for American disaster aid – but it also distorted that aid, as American policy prioritised immediate, visible aid over long-term relief efforts. In the case of the 1959 tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate poisoning, which paralysed 10,000 people, the American disinclination to support long-term relief and rehabilitation efforts rendered the American policy responses ill-suited to the circumstances of the disaster. This disinclination was compounded by fears that generosity would imply culpability for the incident, which originated with the sale of toxic surplus substances from a military base established without permission from the Moroccan government. However, a new and even greater calamity, the earthquake at Agadir, transformed the calculus of American disaster assistance in Morocco, liberating American officials to respond more effectively to the needs of the toxic oil victims. For the historian, the political calculations shaping the US response to the 1959 oil poisoning in Morocco illuminate the dynamics of Cold War humanitarianism; for the disaster response analyst, this case study demonstrates how disaster diplomacy can affect disaster response.