Thailand’s Balancing Behavior, 1947–1991: Some Empirical Evidence

Abstract

This study examines the determinants that shaped the balancing behavior of Thailand from 1947 to 1991 by testing hypotheses developed from arguments on three competing theories of balancing behavior, namely the systemic balance of power and balance of threat theories, as well as Martin’s simple model of balancing behavior. We found that a combination of power, geographic distance, and perceived offensive intentions was the factor that prompted Thailand to balance against threatening states. The finding was found using quantitative data extracted from the Correlates of War (COW) Project and the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Project and those generated by Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (EUGene) software to test the hypotheses. The statistical evidence confirms the historical narrative of Thai diplomatic history: that is, Thailand did not try to balance against communist China, its giant neighbor, but rather against Vietnam and Cambodia, which were perceived as essentially dangerous to the country’s security and territorial integrity. In addition, we found that the major-power capability concentration of the Cold War international system had a mild effect on Thai behavior. However, it is difficult to generalize how such systemic attributes dictated directions in Thai foreign policy.