Abstract
What compels states to cooperate in the face of a global terrorist threat? On an international scale, the elimination of a common terrorist threat resembles a prisoners’ dilemma, with many states choosing to shore up defences at home rather than bear the costs of cooperative, pre-emptive strikes abroad. Utilising original data, this paper represents an empirical examination of the prisoners’ dilemma of counterterrorism to determine what characteristics drive cooperation and whether that cooperation depends on the institutional characteristics of a state, finding that alliance commitments and state capabilities encourage cooperation, while democracy inhibits the achievement of cooperation. These findings illustrate the argument that, although democracies are generally cooperative with one another in matters of international security, the amorphous nature of terrorism fosters a sense of reluctance among democracies regarding proper counterterrorist action.
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