Testing the Matching Hypothesis: The Case of Professional Baseball in Japan with Comparisons to the United States

Abstract

We test the matching hypothesis using data on professional baseball managers in Japan. First, we find that the productivity of managers does not depend on the team he manages. Second, we find that the hazard rate first increases and then decreases as tenure increases for rookie managers but not for veteran managers. Third, the variance of managers′ wages decreases as tenure increases for rookies but not for veterans. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the match between the manager and the team does not affect the productivity of the team. Thus, the matching hypothesis is rejected in the case of Japan, unlike in the case of the United States. However, managers are found to be experience goods in both countries. J. Japan. Int. Econ., June 1994, 8(2), pp. 204–209. Japan; and Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, Tojiin-Kitamachi, Kita-ku, Kyoto 603, Japan.