Testimony and intellectual virtues in Hume’s epistemology

Ruth M Espinosa

doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.03.p29

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, I consider some issues concerning Hume’s epistemology of testimony. I’ll particularly focus on the accusation of reductivism and individualism brought by scholars against Hume’s view on testimonial evidence, based on the tenth section of his An enquiry concerning human understanding. I first explain the arguments against Hume’s position, and address some replies in the literature in order to offer an alternative interpretation concerning the way such a defense should go. My strategy is closely connected with Hume’s notion of virtue and the role it plays in his epistemology, mainly as presented in his A treatise of human nature. I address the problem of how the section “Of miracles” in the Enquiry must be properly understood, as several misunderstandings of Hume’s epistemology of testimony emerge partially from the particular character and aim of that section.

Highlights

Responses to Coady’s criticismCoady’s reconstruction of Hume as a paradigmatic case of reductionism is at odds with many intuitions of Hume’s philosophy
In this paper, I consider some issues concerning Hume’s epistemology of testimony
Coady2 has assessed Hume’s account of testimony as insufficient and misleading, for his theory consists of a “reduction of testimony as a form of evidence or support to the status of inductive inference” (COADY, 1992, p. 79)

Summary

Responses to Coady’s criticism

Coady’s reconstruction of Hume as a paradigmatic case of reductionism is at odds with many intuitions of Hume’s philosophy. According to Michael Welbourne, especially in cases in which the basis of the report is totally unknown to us, it seems that the kind of association that takes place in belief formation is one between testimony ‘as such’ and reality He suggests that Hume shows in some passages to have grasped the intuition that the kind of speech-act performed in testimony is intrinsically associated with the kind of response intended by the speaker, that is, acceptance of the facts as a default response We still need to raise the question of how and under which conditions epistemic agents are justified in believing others’ reports, in what measure it depends on knowledge of human nature and whether those conditions are subjectdependent or maybe community-dependent

Relying on testimony: a matter of virtue?

Testimony as such

Justification of belief and epistemic virtue14