Testimony and Hearsay

Abstract

While many epistemologists stress the importance of testimony, psychologists warn us about its dangers. In the legal domain testimony is usually accepted as evidence, with some restrictions compared to acceptance in everyday contexts. Additional restrictions apply to hearsay, and the traditional ban on hearsay in legal factfinding seems to support a reductionist view of testimony: testimony is valuable insofar as it is based on first-hand knowledge, that is, on perception reported as such, with no inference nor assessment by the declarant. However, contemporary legal systems are more liberal in the admission of hearsay, and this may count as an argument in favor of anti-reductionism. The paper claims that the practical stakes explain the different attitudes towards testimony and hearsay, and that a dichotomy between reductionism and anti-reductionism is unsatisfying in that we need an account that makes sense both of the social importance of testimony and of our preference for the information sources that are closer to the relevant facts.