Abstract

Legal wrangling precipitated by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) has resulted in courts adopting a narrow view of disability. This narrow categorical disability definition is in conflict with current mental health and educational practice that presumes an inclusive view of disability. Test accommodations for licensing exams based on learning impairments provide an example of the conflict generated by legal versus mental health views of disability. Mental health practitioners often support test accommodation requests for students who do not meet the ADA’s strict threshold for disability determination. Mental health practitioners must understand the ADA definition of disability, and test organizations need to examine goals and alter standard practice in a manner that is fair and equitable independent of learning impairments. A recent Supreme Court decision ruled that professional golfer Casey Martin should be allowed to ride a cart in tournaments (PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 2001). In his case, brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), it was successfully argued that Martin has a disability in walking that is covered by the ADA and that the professional golfers’ tour organizers have an obligation to provide this reasonable accommodation. The flurry of opinion articles expressing polarized views concerning the merits of this decision ranged from viewing it as atrocious to admirable (Feinstein, 2001; Leo, 2001; Rohrer, 2001). This decision did not lead to the downfall of professional sports, as suggested by some detractors, nor did it level the playing field for untold numbers of disabled individuals who merely needed some reasonable accommodation to succeed at this level. In fact, it may not be sufficient to help Casey Martin reach his goal of success at the professional tour level. The criticism of this decision highlights significant underlying conflict surrounding the various views of disability, how best to accommodate the disabled, and the role of the ADA in this process. Lost in the hyperbole of criticism surrounding the Martin (2001) decision was the fact that many legal scholars are expressing significant concern that the courts are taking an extremely narrow view of disability as defined by the ADA (Anderson, 2000; Burgdorf, 1997; Friedland, 1999; Lanctot, 1997; Locke, 1997; Mayerson, 1997). In less publicized decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that one is not disabled under this law if mitigating measures effectively remedy the problem (Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 1999; Murphy v. United Parcel Service,

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