Terrorism, the US Army perspective in Iraq

Abstract

Focusing on 2009 and early 2010, this article discusses terrorism in view of the US Army’s experiences in Iraq. Beginning as a high‐intensity or conventional ‘state‐versus‐state’ war, the conflict in Iraq soon slid into low‐intensity warfare, a category including insurgencies, counter‐insurgency operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. This shift, along with the complex challenges of state‐building, was unanticipated by the US Army and sparked an overhaul of military strategy and understanding of insurgents and terrorism based on recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article discusses the US Army’s perspective on insurgents and terrorists – insurgents are seen as having a goal of overthrowing the government while terrorists use calculated violence as a tool to cause fear, coercion and intimidation that may or may not support an insurgency – and describes steps they are taking while partnering with Iraqi security forces to diffuse the actions of both in preparation for complete withdrawal by 31 December 2011. The paper concludes that, while mindful of the potential flashpoint areas in Baghdad and Ninewa provinces, terrorism in early 2010 Iraq is generally understood to be a random short‐term effects‐based tool used as a destabilizing mechanism by a weakening insurgency.