Abstract

This article analyzes the emergence of the militarization of U.S. counterterrorism policy, showing that militarization as well as preemption as a doctrine of fighting terrorism originate in the mid-1980s – counter to the prevailing assumption that the current militaristic counterterrorist approach is both without precedent and largely the result of the 9/11 attacks. Following a radical shift in terrorism discourse in early 1987, the Reagan administration suddenly reverted to a law enforcement approach towards terrorism, which was retained by the George H.W. Bush and the first Clinton administration. The article further demonstrates that counterterrorism measures were strongly contingent to preceding and legitimizing discursive practices that produced knowledge, popular images and mythical narratives of terrorism, and were exploited as a power strategy by the U.S. government. I therefore suggest that the discursive practices that construct terrorism, and thereby structure the potential field of action for both policy makers and security services, and the non-discursive counterterrorism practices should be regarded as an analytical entity connected by a Foucauldian dispositif. ** N.d T. Se mantiene el término dispositif en francés porque así lo hace el autor.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call