Territorial autonomy and ethnic conflict: the Baloch ethnic question post-18th Amendment

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article critically assesses the effectiveness of territorial autonomy under the 18th Constitutional Amendment in managing ethnic conflict in Pakistan's Balochistan province. It argues that limitations in the design and implementation of the federal provisions of the 18th Amendment have hindered the sustainable resolution of the ethnic conflict in Balochistan. Design-wise, the Amendment inadequately addresses key institutional factors that have historically contributed to Balochistan's marginalised status within the federation, notably the Senate's limited powers, non-ethnic-based provincial boundaries, and Baloch under-representation in core state institutions. Design inadequacies are exacerbated by poor implementation of the core federal provisions, especially related to natural resource ownership, local government, and the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Notable implementation hurdles include a persistent ‘centralist’ mind set, particularly pronounced within the military, actively seeking the overturn of the 18th Amendment. The persistence of the de-facto power of the military has undermined the efficacy of territorial autonomy as a conflict management tool.