Abstract
ABSTRACT Research exploring term-limits’ influence on politicians’ behaviour has mainly focused on financial measures of government performance. However, other dimensions of performance which can be used by politicians to claim credit and boost their political careers have seldom been explored in this research agenda. Leveraging the lift of the reelection ban for Mexican mayors after 2014, we study the electoral incentives of term limits on local government performance. We use a difference-in-difference design and compare first-term mayors, thus discarding alternative mechanisms such as differences in competence due to longer tenure. Municipalities where reelection is allowed report more municipal council meetings. Yet, term limits fail to affect the initiatives presented per meeting, administrative procedures on behalf of citizens, nor water provision. Thus, while term limits affect performance incentives for local politicians via accountability and electoral incentives, these focus on more visible and performative actions that serve as inexpensive signals of governmental activity.
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