Abstract
The paper deals with deposit insurance schemes as an integral part of the present system of the banking regulation. Insurance premiums, limits and the rates of compensation and consequences of deposit insurance are then discussed from the theoretical and practical points of view. The moral hazard of banks and depositors and adverse selection are the main undesirable accompanying effects, which are directly connected with the scale of insurance protection in banks. The European Union unifi es the rules of compensation. However, data analysis shows that there are still differences in the levels of protection because of different averages in deposits per household. Some possible alternatives to depositor protection in banks are also analyzed. Although deposit insurance is accompanied by problems, it is the best form of depositor protection.
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