Teoría “dworkiniana” del razonamiento jurídico de Jeremy Waldron: el eslabón ignorado

Jeremy Waldron’s ‘Dworkinian’ Theory of Legal Reasoning: The Neglected Link

This book is about legal theory and legal reasoning. In particular,it seeks to examine the relations that obtain between law and a theory of law and legal reasoning and a theory of legal reasoning. Two features of law and legal reasoning are treated as being of particular importance in this regard: law is institutional, and legal reasoning is formal. These two features are so closely connected that it is reasonable to believe that in fact they are simply two ways of looking at the same issue. This becomes clearer as the focus of the book shifts from the institutional nature of law to the consequences of this for legal reasoning, and which is the principal focus of the book. The author received the European Academy of Legal Theory award in 2000 for the doctoral dissertation on which this work was based.

The Evaluative Life: Between Fact and Value in Maccormick’s Theories of Law and Legal Reasoning

This paper traces, examines and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views shaped gradually, therefore his theory could be divided into two main stages. Thus, a diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is the re-examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.

This paper traces, examines, and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views were shaped gradually so his theory could be divided into two main stages. Therefore, the use of the diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is an examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to an extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of the MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.

Acknowledgements. Introduction. Part I: Conscience and Legal Reasoning. 1. Legal reasoning in the theory of Petrazycki. 2. Thomas Aquinas on conscience. 3. Aquinas's theory of conscience and legal reasoning. 4. Theories of legal reasoning and types of judicial conscience. Part II: Agapic Casuistry in Judicial Decision Making. 5. The method of casuistry. 6. Love as the source of agapic casuistry. 7. Impartial sympathy as an implication of agapic casuistry. 8. Watchfulness as an implication of agapic casuistry. Part III: Agapic Casuistry in Action. 9. Natural justice and conscience of the judges in case Ridge v. Baldwin. 10. Sympathy judgments and the declaratory power of the High Court of Justiciary. 11. Sympathy judgements of conscience in the Russian Constitutional Court. 12. Sympathy judgments of conscience in the European Court of Human Rights. Conclusions. Bibliography. Index.

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance of the one‐right‐answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory .

Virtudes, Argumentación Jurídica y Etica Judicial

As we have seen from the previous chapters, conscience is a complex phenomenon. Since conscience is presented as a human mind passing moral judgements, the problem of the variety of these judgements in its relation to legal reasoning becomes important for the purpose of the present research. Legal reasoning means a kind of reasoning which through finding relevant facts, appropriate legal rules, and good reasons for the application of these rules to the case, leads to a legal decision. There are many states of conscience and there are many types of legal reasoning. The basic presupposition of this book is that a theory of legal reasoning and judicial conscience are closely related to each other. To a certain degree, the variety of theories of legal reasoning represents the variety of moral judgements made by the judges.

This paper presents practical reasoning in the light of John M. Finnis’ new natural law theory. Finnis’ views were shaped by Aquinas’ thoughts on natural law but he was also strongly inspired by Germain Grisez’ new approach, so his theory could be named a new natural law theory. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of legal reasoning as practical reasoning, which Finnis intended mainly as a strong critique of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal reasoning based on the concept of the one right answer. According to the author of this paper, Finnis’ critical approach to Dworkin leads to a gradual extension of the former’s concept of legal reasoning to include positivistic aspects (rapprochement with Joseph Raz’ views) and institutional aspects (rapprochement with Neil MacCormick’s views). Therefore, Finnis’ theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the rapprochement between natural law and legal positivism in contemporary philosophy of law.

The aim of this paper is to compare different conceptions of the role of (normative) coherence in the legal field. More precisely, it aims to deepen Neil MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning, in which coherence is essentially considered an interpretative tool, and Ronald Dworkin's legal theory, in which coherence occupies a more crucial place. The main results of this paper can be summarized in two points. A) For Dworkin, coherence is not just an interpretative standard but constitutes the hard core of his theory of law. B) As a consequence of A, Dworkin's reflections on coherence (as an interpretative standard) cannot be separated from his theory of law grounded on the concept of integrity.

Este trabajo examina el concepto de coherencia y el papel que ésta juega en el razonamiento jurídico. En primer lugar, se ofrece un somero análisis de las teorías de la coherencia en el derecho, prestando atención a las teorías de la justificación tanto de los enunciados normativos como de los enunciados fácticos. En segundo lugar, se identifican una serie de problemas que afectan a las teorías de la coherencia en el derecho, tanto a las teorías que se ocupan de las cuestiones normativas como aquéllas que se centran en las cuestiones fácticas. En tercer lugar, se articula un modelo coherentista con el objetivo de solventar —o, al menos— mitigar los problemas que enfrentan las teorías coherentistas de la justificación jurídica. Según este modelo, una creencia acerca de los hechos o del derecho está justificada si y sólo si es óptimamente coherente, es decir, si es una creencia que un decisor jurídico epistémicamente responsable habría aceptado en virtud de su coherencia en circunstancias similares. Por último, se analizan las implicaciones del modelo de coherencia propuesto para una teoría general de la argumentación jurídica.

This thesis is about the importance to justify decisions in the paradigm that actually is being drawned in Law. This is a moment of democratic opening and judicial decisions transparence, so the reasoning in which they are foundated, are essential to legitimate them and to guarantee the society acceptance. Towards this new Laws approach, Robert Alexy proposes a non positivist theory, in which, Law in order to be legitim, besides positivated, needs to be correct, connected to a claim to correcteness. This work presents, in a panoramic way, Robert Alexys theory, focusing how the author articulates morality and Law and how he elaborates one of the most nowadays sofisticaded laws application procedure. But then arises an important issue: is this new procedure capable to reach fairness decisions? The theory of legal reasoning, in the way it is actually presented, does not seems enough. We understand that the claim to correcteness must explicitely be included in the theory of legal reasoning, by the form of a third step, the correcteness criteria. So it will enables better efficacy in reaching correct judicial decicions. After a presentation of an Alexys proposal to define this correcteness criteria, it is being done some little incursions on Jrgen

In this article I explore the action-guiding capacity of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning. More specifically, my aim is to determine whether this theory will take us further than the so-called legal method, and, if so, whether it can give us the kind of concrete guidance we need when confronted with a hard case. Suppose a judge or an attorney or an administrator really understood and could apply this theory. Would it be of any use to him when faced with a hard case? Would it be able to guide him to a decision when the interpretive arguments conflict with one another? I argue that in many cases MacCormick’s theory can indeed give judges the kind of concrete guidance they need. The reason why MacCormick’s theory is successful in this regard is that it offers judges a reasonably firm ranking of the interpretive arguments, and that it is rather easy to understand and apply. The importance of the latter fact can hardly be exaggerated, because it means that judges will be able to apply the theory even though they may lack a deep understanding of the relevant field of substantive law.

У сучасних умовах розвитку доктрини і практики конституціоналізму, об’єктивованих процесами конституційної модернізації та трансформації конституційно-правових інститутів, комплексне дослідження обґрунтованості судових рішень є одним із першочергових завдань як доктрини конституційного права, так і теорії права. Завдання здійснення правосуддя відповідно до закону іноді може вимагати, зокрема, щоб ті ціннісні судження, які притаманні конституційному ладу, але не виражені або лише недосконало виражені в новітніх правових текстах, були виявлені та реалізовані в реальних рішеннях – у процесі обґрунтування відповідного рішення. Наразі необхідним є наукове вивчення юридичної аргументації у її формі, основним аналізом якої є предметний зміст аргументу, з дотриманням моралі, з огляду на постійні виклики у конституційному судочинстві та вимогу критичного мислення з боку судді при застосуванні соціальної справедливості. Судові рішення є найважливішим результатом у системі правосуддя. Інтерес до досліджень, що стоять за цими рішеннями, значно зріс. Вивчення судової аргументації здійснюється переважно в рамках теорій юридичної аргументації, які були розроблені з другої половини 20-го століття. У цих теоріях відмінність між легкою та складною справою є фундаментальною. У цій статті ми розглядаємо цю відмінність, але на прикладі іншого типу справ. Суддя, далекий від логіки і застосовуючи так званий «практичний розум», насправді є помилковою, обмеженою людиною і, перш за все, усвідомлює порушення не тільки правових, а й моральних цінностей у наших суспільствах.