Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda´s Southeast Asian Network

Abstract

Introduction The horrors of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing war on terrorism galvanized the global community to come to terms with the reality of international terrorism. While the focus of the war on terrorism has been on Afghanistan and Pakistan, one of the key arenas is now Southeast Asia. This has caught both states and individuals in that region by surprise. Though most states in Southeast Asia have a Muslim population, ranging from 5 per cent in the Philippines to 85 per cent in Indonesia, the fact is that the region has always been considered the Islamic periphery. Muslims in Southeast Asia have long been characterized as secular, tolerant, modernist, and development-oriented. Moreover, many people within and outside Southeast Asia had believed that the violence and terrorism, which is a daily reality in the Middle East, was anathema to Southeast Asia. The disclosure of the extent to which Al Qaeda cells were established, and linkages between militant Muslim organizations in Southeast Asia to Al Qaeda were made, has shocked Southeast Asian governments. Al Qaeda had slowly penetrated the region for more than a decade beginning in 1991, co-opting individuals and groups, establishing independent cells, and finding common cause with local militants for four main reasons. First, whereas there have long been militant Muslim groups who have been fighting for their own homeland in the southern Philippines, Aceh, and to a degree in southern Thailand and Myanmar, these groups were seen to have completely domestic agendas and little interest in linking-up with international Muslim organizations. Al Qaeda emerged in Southeast Asia at a time when state-sponsorship of terrorism, notably by Libya, was waning. Moreover, Al Qaeda was able to build on its personal relationships with veterans of the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan. The leadership of almost every militant Islamic group in Southeast Asia, from the Kumpulan Mujaheddin Malaysia, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Laskar Jihad, had fought with the Mujaheddin. By linking their domestic struggles with an international network, the leaders of these groups were able to pool and share resources, conduct joint training, assist each other in weapons and explosives procurement, and engage in money-laundering a nd financial transfers. By working internationally, domestic-oriented groups were better able to achieve their goals. Secondly, although the majority of the populations in Southeast Asian societies are secular and tolerant, radical Islam is growing for a variety of reasons. These include economic dispossession, the lack of political freedom, the spread of Wahhabism and Salafi Islam, the failure of secular education, and an increased number of religious students studying in Middle Eastern and South Asian madrasah (Islamic schools). Although radical Islamicists are a distinct minority in Southeast Asia, in many cases they have shaped the agenda, and secular nationalists have not always stood up to them. Thirdly, Southeast Asian states have been what might be termed countries of convenience for terrorists, with tourist-friendly policies and minimal visa requirements, generally lax financial oversights, well-established informal remittance systems for overseas workers, porous borders, often weak central government control, endemic government corruption, and a vast supply of illicit arms. Finally, Southeast Asia's multi-ethnic, tolerant, and secular societies have actually attracted Al Qaeda to the region. As states focused on other threats, they had dropped their guard in relation to the potential terrorist risk. Although the Philippines raised the spectre of international terrorists operating in the region in the mid-1990s, its cries fell on deaf ears. States saw terrorism as a problem, but not a problem they considered as a direct threat to themselves. …