Abstract
In the first paper of the tensor-centric warfare (TCW) series [1], we proposed a tensor model of combat generalizing earlier Lanchester-type systems with a particular emphasis on contemporary military thinking, including the distributed C4ISR system (Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). In the present paper, we extend this initial tensor combat model with entropic Lie-derivative machinery in order to capture some aspects of this deep uncertainty, while, in the process, formalizing into our model military notion of symmetry and asymmetry in warfare as a commutator, also known as a Lie bracket. In doing so, we have sought to shift the question from the prediction of outcomes of combat, upon which previous combat models such as the Lanchester-type equations have been typically constructed, towards determining the uncertainty outcomes, using a rigorous analytical basis.
Highlights
It is generally agreed in military and defence research circles that the older strictly hierarchical manner of organization of military forces and force design decision-making oriented around considering capability in terms of collections of platforms leave something to be desired
We extend this initial tensor combat model with entropic Lie-derivative machinery in order to capture some aspects of this deep uncertainty, while, in the process, formalizing into our model military notion of symmetry and asymmetry in warfare as a commutator, known as a Lie bracket
We developed the tensor-centric warfare (TCW) model [1], comprising a generalized tensorial union of the classical Lanchester-Osipov combat equations [8] [9] [10]) and distributed C4ISR systems, towards a combat model able to capture the basic notion of collaboratively oriented and functionally individuated networked military forces, under the broad aim of capturing some of the features of uncertainty in a formal model that have proven so challenging to model in the past
Summary
It is generally agreed in military and defence research circles that the older strictly hierarchical manner of organization of military forces and force design decision-making oriented around considering capability in terms of collections of platforms leave something to be desired. Military theorizing has largely followed the pattern of long-established classical system engineering-type methods, which have proven successful in dealing with tame problems but which are known to not generalist adequately to problems that manifest incomplete and contradictory requirements, non-stationarity, complex interwoven interdependencies, unpredictability of future states, and are effectively unique. These considerations are nothing new: even the founding intellectuals of the Military Enlightenment understood war and battle as manifesting complex, messy phenomena and grappled with what this means for rational theory development. Composition, strategy and operating methods are said to be asymmetrical
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