Tensions at the outset of a common European Development Policy: clientelism, conditionality and effectiveness

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this article I look at the 1970s debates between the member states of the European Communities and the European Commission regarding the criteria to be used to select European Development Fund (EDF) projects and the use of political conditionality in the first EEC development aid framework, specifically, the Lomé Convention. These debates are interesting for what they reveal in terms of EEC legitimacy and way of functioning as a new actor in the field of development aid and foreign policy. They demonstrate that the legitimacy of the European Commission – and of the EEC/EU as an external actor – remained linked to personal and client-based relationships with African heads of state. The effect of this was that instead of being able to impose its own norms and criteria (whether economic or political), the EEC was forced to compromise with and adapt to the norms and criteria of its African clients.