Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between the service contract (and tender) design and the outcome of the tender in the local public tran sport. Data are collected through a survey involving about 50 territorial entities. It emerges that optimal contract (and tender) design crucially depends on the objective function of the regulator. Participation is encouraged by a semi-rigid model, by gross cost contracts, by weak incentives and by opportunity of sub-contracting. Vice versa, rebates are favoured by long duration of the contract, by strong incentives and (again) by opportunity for sub-contracting. Finally, having a new winner is favoured by strong incentives, by asset availability.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
