Tenants' Dilemma- On Collective Action in Housing

Abstract

This paper discusses tenant participation in a rational choice perspective, where collective action will neither be initiated, nor maintained, unless found profitable in one way or another by every single individual taking part. This ' n -person prisoners' dilemma' indicates that not the failures but the successful cases of tenant participation call for an explanation. It is claimed that a better understanding of collective action in housing may be developed only if the general and specific conditions of the local housing arena are considered. This includes the following assertions: (1) different tenants may have different motives for taking part in collective action; (2) the dynamics of the relations between tenants must be considered when analysing the conditions of initiating and retaining co-operation; (3) there are different types of collective action in housing, including collective consumption, collective work and collective decision-making; (4) the physical and social conditions of specific housing estates can be more or less favourable to co-operation; (5) tenure forms often define the institutional conditions of collective action in housing.