Abstract
Tenancy has been increasing in the post-reform period, in which pure tenancy has significant share. The pure tenants lack ownership rights over the land, which restricts access to agricultural inputs from the formal sources. This leads to the emergence of personalised informal arrangements with moneylenders and other input dealers. Using village-level data, we attempt to understand how input and output markets interact in informal arrangements. If so, what is their impact on the output and rental rates in a village economy? This study shows that the cultivators go for interlinked exchanges ranging from zero to three, and a significant share of them have more than two interlinkages in the input market. It is also evident that the more the number of linkages, the more the output produced and rent paid. This self-exploitative arrangement has the potential to become a vicious cycle in the future.
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