Temporality and boredom

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Heidegger's phenomenological investigation of boredom offers important clues for better understanding the notoriously difficult notion of non-objectifying intentionality (Langsintentionalitat). I begin by examining Husserl's account of the aporetic nature of self-temporalization and I claim that a discussion of moods can further clarify the relation between Langsintentionalitat and the absolute time-constituting consciousness. Although Husserl himself broached the problem of the intentionality of moods, it was Heidegger who gave us a full-blown account of it. I point out the correspondences between Heidegger's morphology of boredom and Husserl's analysis of temporal syntheses and I argue that the concept of absolute consciousness has much to gain from being confronted with the idea of 'genuine boredom'.