Abstract

Proof-carrying code (PCC) is a framework for ensuring that untrusted programs are safe to install and execute. When using PCC, untrusted programs are required to contain a proof that allows the program text to be checked efficiently for safe behavior. In this paper, we lay the foundation for a potential engineering improvement to PCC. Specifically, we present a practical approach to using temporal logic to specify security policies in such a way that a PCC system can enforce them.KeywordsProof-carrying codetemporal logic

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