Abstract
Past studies have employed the subjective experience of decision time (Libet’s W) as an index of consciousness, marking the moment at which the agent first becomes aware of a decision. In the current study, we examined whether the temporal experience of W affects subsequent experience related to the action. Specifically, we tested whether W influenced the perception of difficulty in a decision-making task, hypothesizing that temporal awareness of W might influence the sense of difficulty. Consistent with our predictions, when W was perceived as early or late, participants subsequently rated the decision difficulty to be easy or difficult, respectively (Exp.1). Further investigation showed that perceived difficulty, however, did not influence W (Exp.2). Together, our findings suggest a unidirectional relationship such that W plays a role in the metacognition of difficulty evaluation. The results imply that subjective temporal experience of decision time modifies the consequential sense of difficulty.
Highlights
A seminal study by Libet and colleagues examined the timing of decisions, questioning whether volition played a causal role in action output [1]
To determine that W had an influence on difficulty ratings, we must rule out a simpler explanation of a mediating influence of response time on both W and difficulty ratings
To illustrate the effect of the tone manipulation on W, the W reports were subjected to a paired sample t-test comparing the Delayed Tone and No Tone conditions
Summary
A seminal study by Libet and colleagues examined the timing of decisions, questioning whether volition played a causal role in action output [1]. Participants performed a simple voluntary act (e.g., wrist flexion or a button press) and reported the time they felt the urge to act. This reported time, termed W, is often taken to signify the earliest moment in which one becomes aware of the moment of decision to execute an action. The latency of W relative to the timing of the readiness potential led to the interpretation that a conscious decision to act does not cause an action In support of this view, Masicampo and Baumeister explained that the latency of W occurred too late in the event to be involved in the initiation of behaviors [3].
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