Telling Tales of Conformity and Mutual Interests

Abstract

Nations have no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.-Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Minister, 1846-51Institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.1International relations is difficult subject of study, due to the intricacy of myriad issues left unresolved by practitioners and/or theorists. Primary to these issues is the concept of power - how to define it, who exercises it, and who authorizes its use. A major part of this complexity is that relations is practised in an anarchic system - system where there is no recognized overarching authority to determine who gets what, when, and how. This has resulted in the narrative, according to which certain collective norms and practices are perceived to form the basis on which states and nonstate actors interact.2 In contrast to this governance is government, which is seen to dwell more on politics and some kind of binding decisions regarding norms, principles, and procedure. This article analyzes the limits or deficiencies of such normative claims and also intends to shed light on the applicability of norms at both the and domestic levels. In this context, the article argues that the order, while very appealing and modest, does not sufficientiy explain states' behaviour (especially that of powerful ones) at the level. Inasmuch as the formation of interdependences, regimes, and transnational organizations are on the ascendency, states (at least for now) continue to hold centrality in world affairs, and powerful states often determine how and to where the power pendulum swings. In fact, much of what goes on in the system is dominated and controlled by these states, which often determine the extent to which organizations and other transnational networks influence the system. This phenomenon leads to the marginalization of other states that are expected to be equal members of these organizations. Hence, mutual interest does not often translate into mutual benefits. This, I will argue, is the primary limit of (neo)liberal order. Governance without government refers to Kenneth Waltz's third image - the condition where there is no arbiter to ensure that there is real as opposed to imagined conformity to rules, principles, or norms of behaviour. This has implications for international hierarchy as well. For the purpose of this discussion, organizations, institutions, and regimes, all with normative underpinnings, will be used interchangeably. And liberal here encompasses regime theory, (neo)liberal institutionalism, and the English school, as well as aspects of constructivism - especially those constructivists who share the ontology of socially constructed global order (such as Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink). This conglomeration of theories can be problematic but for analytical purposes I insist and will show that all of these theories share common ground. I shall use the European Union to buttress the statist critique and the United Nations global compact to illuminate the ethical challenge of order.THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF WORLD ORDERIn terms of general conception, Bull defines order as a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals ofthe society of states or system.3 These are elementary and universal goals that most theorists will name as security against violence, keeping promises, or carrying out agreements, and stability in the possession of things (property).A central feature of (neo)liberal institutionalism is the idea of complex/ global interdependence - relative consensus deriving from mutual or shared interests. The perception is that even though states may sometimes form interdependencies, they do not control the outcomes as the regime is endowed with kind of invisible hand to steer affairs and ensure that all interests and concerns are considered. …