Abstract
If self deception is a lie that one tells to oneself, then paradoxically the deceived is also simultaneously the deceiver. This paper considers two contrasting conceptualizations of self-deception: A.R. Mele's (1987) account of cognitive functioning and J.P Sartre's (1989) existential exploration of ‘bad faith’. Both writers seek to resolve the ‘paradox’ of self-deception or bad faith without recourse to the positing of mental partitioning or the Freudian unconscious. Mele uncovers and lays bare the underlying structure of self-deception, revealing it to consist in desire-driven perceptual and interpretational shortcomings. Sartre's analysis of bad faith emerges from his ontology and is bound up with his notions of ‘being-for’ and the tension between personal ‘transcendence’ and ‘facticity’. Finally, the implications for psychotherapy of Mele's and Sartre's accounts are considered.
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