Abstract
Despite international calls to increase reporting and protect whistleblowers few who witness bribery are willing to come forth. We developed and conducted a survey addressing issues of corruption and whistleblower intentions among public officials in the Baltic states. Running regression analysis on answers from 1706 public officials, we substantiate that the notion of public duty through meritocratic processes and internalized support for the arm’s length principle are positively related to whistleblowing intentions. Moreover, by extending earlier arguments concerning the suppression of whistleblower intentions through collegial and/or formal sanctions we find that combinations of severe sanctions will lead to a counter reaction—blowing the whistle—in pure defiance: When enough is enough.
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