Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia by Sarah Oates (review)

Abstract

766 SEER, 86, 4, OCTOBER 2008 Despite these, and other, shortcomings, Runaway State-Building is a signifi cant and substantive monograph which develops a valuable link between state building and party competition, and presents important findings. It is a recommended read for those interested in state-building and patronage innew democracies, as well as party scholars more generally. Department ofPolitical Science& International Studies Ingrid van Biezen Universityof Birmingham Oates, Sarah. Television,Democracy andElections inRussia. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 27. Roudedge, London and New York, 2006. xv + 222 pp. Figures. Tables. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?65.00. Television is the primary means of top-down political communication in Russia today. Slick, careful, pro-government reporting and analysis present reality as the Kremlin sees it, and Russians, by and large, accept this state-of affairs with resignation. Sarah Oates's study shows us how this came about, using an impressive array of interviews with media professionals, focus-group findings and survey data. An enormous amount of work, supported by several major research grants, has gone into this book. Oates analyses three elements in the process of political communication: media environment, content and audience. In tackling the first of these, she finds that although media law seems to provide for freedom of speech, in reality journalists face multiple constraints on their independence and professional freedom. Both state officials and owners of commercial or semi commercial media oudets use themedia to promote political and corporate interests.For journalists who engage indaring or confrontational investigative reporting, there is a high risk of being fired, and the persistent offender runs the risk of being physically attacked or even murdered. Oates's focus is on TV election coverage and political advertising. She analyses approximately one month of evening news programmes on the lead ing state-owned channel, ORT, and the leading commercial channel, NTV, during each of three Duma and three presidential election campaigns from 1995 through 2004. Concurrently, she examines a selection of the paid political advertising and free-time spots provided toparties under election law. In the 1995-96 election season the state or state interests did not have a controlling stake in NTV. Although NTV had taken a critical stance on thewar inChechnya in 1995, both channels rallied toEl'tsin's support in the crucial 1996 presidential election, eschewing any pretence at objectivity. The loyalist trend continued during the 1999 and 2000 election season, and moves during Putin's first term against oligarchs with television interests eliminated the few remaining pockets of editorial independence. By 2003, Kremlin dominance of all national TV channels appeared to have been consolidated. Oates uses focus-groups to tap into viewers' responses. These included a series of twenty-four focus groups before and after the 2000 presidential elec tions, as well as ten focus groups after the 2004 election. Participants were REVIEWS 767 asked about the role of themedia, their own viewing habits, and specifically about whether or not themedia influenced theirvote.Most showed awareness of bias on television and of deliberate attempts tomanipulate public opinion. An oil worker said of the 2000 campaign 'There was the impression that only one man was really running, i.e. Putin [...] It didn't beat you over the head, itwas very competent [eto ne v lob delaetsya, a ochen' gramotno]' (p. 145). Some participants admitted being influenced by what they watched even though theyknew the informationwas one-sided. Others appeared to accept bias as natural: theirprincipal criticismswere not about a lack of objectivity but about the negativity of themedia. Focus-group findings such as these can enhance our sensitivity to the Russian audience, but do not prove that TV carries the vote. On this point, Oates turns to survey data. She organized an opinion survey dedicated tomedia issues in 2001, updated by an additional survey in the winter of 2003/04. Her 2001 data snowed that themedian Russian adult watched two to three hours of television on a weekday, and four tofive hours on days off.The 2003/04 survey showed thatmore than four-fifths of respon dents heard about politics on television either daily or several times a week. She presents regressions showing that, controlling for demographic...