Teleology and Final Causation in Aristotle and in Contemporary Science

BOOK REVIEWS 427 Methodological Foundations of Relativistic Mechanics. By MARSHALL SPECTOR. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972. Pp. 192. $10.95. The Field Concept in Contemporary Science. By MENDEL SAcHs. American Lecture Series, M. Farber, ed. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1973. Pp. 132. Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. Second, enlarged edition. By ADOLF GRUNBAUM. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XII, R. S. Cohen & M. W. Wartofsky, eds. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973. Pp. 907. $17.90. The three titles listed above are recent works in the philosophy of science, similar in their addressing scientific topics that are somewhat esoteric for the ordinary philosopher and yet quite different in their levels of approach and degrees of sophistication. While none of the three offers a definitive solution to current problems in the philosophy of science, all are worthy of notice as providing useful background and for suggesting new insights that may help decide substantive issues within this discipline. In their editorial introduction to Griinbaum's work Robert Cohen and Marx Wartofsky agree that this is "one of the few major works in the philosophy of the natural sciences in this generation " and go on to praise the author for his admirable exemplification of the "Aristotelian devotion to the intimate and useful dependence of actual science and philosophical understanding ." (p. xiii) All three of the works under review show a deep awarenes of such mutual interdependence between science and philosophy, an awareness that was shared also by Thomas Aquinas when he had reached the peak of his intellectual career, and for this reason alone merit being called to the attention of readers of The Thomist. * * * Spector's analysis of relativistic mechanics is the work of a philosopher who is concerned with the methodological foundations of the special theory of relativity, who can and does employ sufficient mathematics to state his position unambiguously, and who is concerned to go beyond positivist interpretations of Einstein's special theory to suggest a conceptual understanding of that theory more sympathetic to realism. Unlike many popular expositions of special relativity, which concentrate on its kinematic aspects and treat such well-worn topics as simultaneity, light cones, world lines, and the four-dimensional manifold, Spector's work by-passes most of this material and focuses instead on the dynamical aspects of the special theory, paying particular attention to the changes induced in the concepts of force, mass, and energy in the transition from classical to relativistic dynamics. 4~8 BOOK REVIEWS The author is concerned exclusively with the special theory, mentioning Einstein's general theory only in passing. Spector's book may be roughly divided into three parts. The first deals with the methodological foundations of classical mechanics, with primary emphasis on dynamics and on delineating the paradigm this provides for mechanical explanation. The second part goes into the foundations of classical electrodynamics, introduces the concepts of frame of reference and Galilean transformation, and delineates the crisis situation that developed towards the end of the nineteenth century as proposed mechanical models of the ether proved unsatisfactory. The third part then explains how special relativity arose as a response to the crisis situation in classical mechanics and electrodynamics, and how Einstein's laws of mechanics differ from those of Newton, tracing the implications of this for understanding various force functions and the famous equation, E = mc2• Some of Spector's distinctive theses include the following: that F = ma represents the essential content of Newton's second law of motion, and that the first law of motion is actually a consequence of, and not a propadeutic to, the second law; that mechanical explanations in the classical sense are causal explanations made through the application of Newton's second law and particular force laws; that an element of conventionality enters into classical mechanics through the constraints that are placed on the kinds of force laws regarded as allowable; that the luminiferous ether was originally conceived to supply a mechanical explanation of light phenomena ; that the failure of the program to reduce electrodynamics to classical mechanics did not automatically entail the rejection of an ether, nor did it necessitate the identification of an ether...

This study examines research trends in the philosophy of science within the educational context, focusing on its ontological, epistemological, and axiological dimensions. Using a bibliometric approach, 868 academic publications from 2010 to 2024 were analyzed, sourced from Scopus and Google Scholar with keywords such as “Philosophy of Science in Education” and “Educational Philosophy and Knowledge. Data were processed and visualized using VOSviewer to identify patterns, themes, and collaboration networks. The findings revealed six key clusters: philosophical foundations in educational practices, ontological and epistemological dimensions in educational research, historical and scientific perspectives, problem-solving approaches, axiological dimensions, and Islamic perspectives in educational philosophy. These results highlight the growing integration of interdisciplinary perspectives, critical thinking, and value-based education to address global challenges such as technological advancements and cultural shifts. This study contributes to the literature by offering insights into the evolving role of philosophy in education, emphasizing the importance of ethical leadership, cultural inclusivity, and sustainable educational practices. The findings provide actionable guidance for policymakers, educators, and researchers in designing curricula and pedagogical strategies that align with 21st-century educational needs while fostering moral and social responsibility.

Chapter 6 discusses the notion of teleology and elaborates on the teleological nature of ‘prudential-ordinative’ providence. First, the chapter revisits the notions of teleology and final causation, it illustrates the modern transformation of teleology, and shows why final causation matters for the doctrine of providence. Next, the chapter defends the view that Aquinas envisions the providential ordering of all creatures through immanent teleology against an inconsistency objection stating that due to the so-called ‘cognition condition’, Aristotelian teleology is not available in Aquinas’ account of providence. The chapter argues that this claim can be illustrated by the scholastic notion of appetitus. The chapter then develops at length a theory of appetency, by revisiting the notion of a (natural) appetite, which the chapter renders and explains in terms of formal and material natural inclinations. Finally, the chapter shows how God can providentially guide the world through appetites and what role final causes play in his providence.

This text offers three aspects regarding the current trends in philosophy of science and prospects for the near future. First, the philosophical framework in which these most influential trends are situated. In these, there is novelty in terms of the topics covered and the approaches provided, along with continuity in other trends. Second, this initial chapter affords the main lines of research followed in the other chapters offered here, which are articulated in the five thematic parts in the book: (I) Philosophy of Medicine and Climate Change; (II) Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; (III) New Analyses of Probability and the Use of Mathematics in Practice; (IV) Scientific Progress Revisited; and (V) Scientific Realism and the Instrumentalist Alternative. Third, the origin of this book and its link with the Center for Research in Philosophy of Science and Technology (CIFCYT) of the University of A Coruña.KeywordsCurrentTrendsPhilosophy of ScienceProspectsNearFutureFrameworkLines of researchBook’s origin

Abstract
 Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dampak yang signifikan dari This research aims to analyze the significant impact of the development of the philosophy of science on contemporary science. Philosophy of science has long been a conceptual basis for understanding scientific epistemology, methodology and ethics. In this context, this research traces the evolution of the philosophy of science from classical thought to the modern era and how these views shape and influence the science we have today. The research method used involves analysis of historical and philosophical literature, highlighting the thoughts of influential philosophers of science such as Plato, Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, and other important figures. This research also considers developments in the philosophy of science, such as positivism, postmodernism, and feminist thought, as well as the ways in which these views have influenced research methodology, epistemological understanding, and contemporary scientific practice. The results of this research reveal that the philosophy of science has played an important role in the formation of scientific paradigms, the development of scientific theories, as well as in the development of more reflective and ethical research practices. The impact of the philosophy of science is also reflected in the research ethics controversies and fundamental questions about the nature of science that continue to be debated in scientific society today. This research provides a deeper understanding of the close relationship between philosophy of science and contemporary science, and underlines the importance of philosophical awareness in developing better and more responsible knowledge. These findings may provide a foundation for further developments in deep philosophical thinking about science and future scientific research.
 Keywords: philosophy of science, science, contemporary

The purpose here is to explore certain aspects of the philosophy of science which have serious implications both for the practice of social and political science and for understanding that practice. The current relationship between social science and the philosophy of science (or the philosophy of the social sciences) is a curious one. Despite the emergence of a considerable body of literature in philosophy which is pertinent to the methodological problems of social science, there has been a lack of osteusive ties between the two areas. A justified concern with the independence of social scientific research has contributed to a tendency toward isolation which is unfortunate in view of the proliferation of philosophical problems which necessarily attends the rapid expansion of any empirical discipline. Although in the literature of contemporary social science there are frequent references to certain works in the philosophy of science and to philosophical issues relating to methodology, these are most often in the context of bald pronouncements and shibboleths relating to the nature of science, its goals, and the character of its reasoning. But what is most disturbing about the fact that social scientists have little direct and thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of science is not merely that there has been a failure to carefully examine the many logical and epistemological assumptions which are implicit in social scientific inquiry, since this task might normally and properly be considered to be within the province of the philospher of science.

The purpose here is to explore certain aspects of the philosophy of science which have serious implications both for the practice of social and political science and for understanding that practice. The current relationship between social science and the philosophy of science (or the philosophy of the social sciences) is a curious one. Despite the emergence of a considerable body of literature in philosophy which is pertinent to the methodological problems of social science, there has been a lack of osteusive ties between the two areas. A justified concern with the independence of social scientific research has contributed to a tendency toward isolation which is unfortunate in view of the proliferation of philosophical problems which necessarily attends the rapid expansion of any empirical discipline. Although in the literature of contemporary social science there are frequent references to certain works in the philosophy of science and to philosophical issues relating to methodology, these are most often in the context of bald pronouncements and shibboleths relating to the nature of science, its goals, and the character of its reasoning. But what is most disturbing about the fact that social scientists have little direct and thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of science is not merely that there has been a failure to carefully examine the many logical and epistemological assumptions which are implicit in social scientific inquiry, since this task might normally and properly be considered to be within the province of the philospher of science.

History and philosophy complement and overlap each other in subject matter, but the two disciplines exhibit conflict over methodology. Since Hempel's challenge to historians that they should adopt the covering law model of explanation, the methodological conflict has revolved around the respective roles of the general and the particular in each discipline. In recent years, the revival of narrativism in history, coupled with the trend in philosophy of science to rely upon case studies, joins the methodological conflict anew. So long as contemporary philosophy of science relies upon history's methodology to construct its case studies, it subjects itself to a paradoxical situation: the better the history, the worse the philosophy. An example of the methodological conflict is presented in the case of Antoine Lavoisier. This example also serves our ultimateconclusion, which is that distinctively philosophical methods of case-study design promise enhanced prescriptive powers for philosophy of science.

Historically, the problem of discovery or the problem of the genesis of scientific ideas has been taken seriously by the historians, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers who analyzed the creative thinking and formation of ideas and attempted to provide a meaningful account of them. In fact, the philosophical concern with scientific discovery is as old as science and philosophy of science themselves. However, almost throughout the first half of 20th century, philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of scientific discovery remained in a state of suspended animation. This is because the dominant trend in philosophy of science in this period outlawed it. The dominant view in philosophy of science maintained that the phenomenon of scientific discovery is philosophically irrelevant, and an adequate philosophical understanding of science should confine itself to the way in which scientific theories are justified; it was assumed that the process of justification is a neat, spick-and-span phenomenon eminently suited to be described in terms which are, logically speaking, cut and dry. The process of justification or evaluation according to this orthodox view constitutes the essence of science. Obviously, justification was demarcated from discovery. Justification, because of its supposed epistemic transparency, became the exclusive focus of philosophical attention to the detriment of discovery. The invidious distinction between discovery of scientific ideas and justification of finished ideas of science remained the catchword for a long time. This paper is an attempt to critically examine the nihilistic attitude of the dominant philosophies of science and to arrive at a philosophical theory of scientific discovery.

This fourth volume of the Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective” deals with new challenges in this field. In this regard, it seeks to broaden the scope of the philosophy of science in two directions. On the one hand, this book looks for issues in scientific disciplines that have received little attention so far in the mainstream philosophy of science (e.g., design sciences, communication sciences or forensic science). On the other, it addresses new topics in well-established disciplines, seeking novelty from different angles of the philosophical research. To some extent, this volume tries to embrace the somehow “neglected sciences” as well as the new trends in philosophy of science.

Once upon a time there was a little girl who refused to eat her supper. In her efforts to persuade the child, her mother had recourse to the old ploy: “Think of all the starving children in India!” To which the little girl responded, “Name one!”. Far from being a mere exercise in pseudo-spontaneity this story contains everything that needs to be said about Halfmann’s thesis in nuce. The task of commenting upon Halfmann’s thesis is indeed onerous precisely because it rests upon interpretations of interpretations and, like the little girl’s mother’s argument, suffers from lack of examples. Because this is the case, the task of the commentator becomes one of questioning the validity of the interpretations upon which Halfmann’s interpretations rest. In short, the rarefied level at which his paper is written invites broadside cannon fire rather than dainty parry with a foil. Halfmann’s original sub-title was ‘Capitalism and the Philosophy of Science’, which was accurate and useful in discussion. Thus, it is necessary to begin to ask Halfmann to clarify his thesis by explaining precisely what he means when he asserts that capitalism has so altered the function of metascience that government and industry have supplanted philosophy of science. Is this a thesis about the factors which must be given primary consideration in writing a history of a sociology of science (i.e., a research proposal) or is it also an explanation of current developments in philosophy of science, which assumes that there is a crisis of rationality in contemporary science — and not merely among those who claim to be K. R. Popper’s legitimate successors — or is it both of these? Briefly, is Halfmann presenting an heuristic or a manifesto. There are as many reasons for welcoming the former as there are for being repelled by the latter.

In this chapter, I survey key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate in contemporary philosophy of science. The first is a selective realist position, which is known as Explanationist Realism, according to which we should believe only in the indispensable parts of our best scientific theories. Those parts that are considered indispensable, the so-called “working posits” (Kitcher, The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusions. Oxford University Press, New York, 1993), are the ones that are responsible for, or best explain, the predictive success of our best scientific theories (Psillos, Scientific realism: how science tracks truth. Routledge, London, 1999). The second is an antirealist position with a long history in philosophy of science (see, for example, Duhem, The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Translated from the French by Philip P. Wiener, 1954/1982), known as Instrumentalism, according to which scientific theories are mere instruments or tools of prediction (Rowbottom, The instrument of science: scientific anti-realism revitalised. Routledge, London, 2019). The third is an influential antirealist position, which is known as Constructive Empiricism and is due to Bas van Fraassen (The scientific image. Oxford University Press, New York, 1980), according to which science aims at empirical adequacy, not truth or approximate truth. The fourth is another influential realist position, which is known as Entity Realism and is due to Ian Hacking (Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1983), according to which one is justified in taking a realist stance with respect to entities that can be manipulated and that facilitate interventions in nature (Sankey, Howard, Scientific realism and the rationality of science. Ashgate, Hampshire, 2008). The fifth is another selective realist position, which is known as Structural Realism, according to which we should be realists, not about theoretical entities or processes, but rather about structures (Worrall, Dialectica 43(1–2):99–124, 1989; Ladyman, Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. A 29(3):409–424, 1998; French, The structure of the world: metaphysics and representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014).

Reviewed by: Husserl and the Sciences: Selected Perspectives David Morris (bio) Richard Feist , editor. Husserl and the Sciences: Selected PerspectivesUniversity of Ottawa Press. x, 230. $35.00 This collection of essays by Canadian and European philosophers sheds new and thoughtful light on the relation between Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), [End Page 320] founder of phenomenological philosophy, and the mathematical and natural sciences. Once upon a time, Kant tried to enthrone philosophy as 'the queen of the sciences.' Now the situation seems quite the reverse, since contemporary natural science would claim to explain everything scientifically, including philosophy, natural science, knowing, and thinking, not to mention sexual preferences, ethics, etc - just open your morning paper for the latest. Granted its starting points, contemporary science would thus dethrone philosophy. Strangely enough, most philosophy of science, at least in the English-speaking world, is willing to grant this. Instead of asking how scientific knowledge first gets started in the world - the original question of epistemology - current philosophy of science pursues a subtly but drastically different question, namely, how, given knowledge already underway, scientists come to possess standards and methods for arriving at scientific truth. Instead of digging down past the roots of science, current philosophy offers to shore up knowledge as outlined by science. For Husserl this shift marks nothing less than the crisis of the European sciences, a crisis in which the sciences, philosophy, and European culture dangerously lose sight of their starting point in what Husserl calls the life-world, in a pre-scientific engagement with a living human world. (Husserl is writing about this in 1933, and was himself persecuted by the Nazi regime.) As Husserl puts it, 'it is not always natural science that speaks when natural scientists are speaking.' Husserl thus adds his voice to those of recent figures such as Bruno Latour, Peter Galison, and Georges Canguilhem, who find something other than natural science - social processes, material cultures of image making, pre-scientific concepts - speaking in natural science. But Husserl has a different, more radical contribution to make, precisely because his work, which from the start is driven to root mathematics and science in the soil of experience, takes him to the most basic philosophical questions about the genesis of science. Unfortunately, Husserl is not often studied as a philosopher of science, and his contributions to this area are often overlooked in light of his immense contributions to phenomenology and insights into areas such as cognition. (Husserl's star is currently rising among cognitive scientists, for example.) Richard Feist's collection is an important and welcome corrective, especially in the English-speaking world. For those interested in the deep questions that philosophy and the humanities still pose to the natural sciences, part 3 of this collection, 'Phenomenology, the Sciences, and Community,' will be most important, with contributions tracing Husserl's views of the relation between the life-world and the natural sciences, and studying the roots of science in communal praxis. The most expansive part is part 2, 'Phenomenology, Mathematics, and Physics.' As Feist emphasizes in his helpful introduction, [End Page 321] Husserl not only carried out philosophical investigations into the foundations of mathematics and science, he knew and corresponded with several mathematicians and scientists, who were, as was characteristic of this period, preoccupied by foundational questions. The essays in this part give us enlightening glimpses of these connections. Especially fascinating are studies of Husserl's relation to and influence on the mathematician and physicist Herman Weyl, in which we learn about the connection between Husserl's phenomenology and Weyl's interpretation of relativity. Other essays canvass Husserl's relation to the geometry of David Hilbert and his views of multiplicities. The essays in part 1, 'Phenomenology, Epistemology, and the Sciences,' take up some now-classic questions of Husserlian phenomenology with special attention to issues of math and science. Like Husserl's philosophy, Husserl scholarship is a notably rigorous discipline, and it is hard to leap into it unprepared. Husserl and the Sciences is not a book for the unprepared - it is hard work and presumes more than passing familiarity with Husserl. For those prepared, it will be rewarding and significant. It is very good to see...

Removing Knowledge

The problem of teleology is the question whether all natural processes can be adequately explained in terms of efficient causality. In contemporary philosophy and science there is a strong aversion to explanations by final causation; most approaches consider teleological processes as a special kind of mechanical processes, and try to reduce teleological explanations to explanations based solely on efficient causation.1 Typical examples of such reductionist strategies are the system theoretical and cybernetic approaches.2 Furthermore, there are the approaches of certain evolutionary biologists who maintain on the one hand that biology cannot do without teleological language, but on the other hand insist that the explanations of biological processes need to be based on nothing but efficient causation.3