Abstract
This article examines the use of Telegram as a means of political communication by the ruling political elite in Russia (both external, i.e., communication with the society and other political forces, and internal, i.e., between different, often rival, groups within the elite itself). While Telegram is illegal at the official level, and attempts have been made to block it in Russia since April 2018, unofficially the Russian authorities continue to actively use Telegram channels for political communication and influencing public opinion as well as for monitoring the mood of the public. What is the reason for this ambivalent attitude toward Telegram? What makes it so attractive for the Russian establishment? How are the authorities using Telegram for their own purposes? Answering these questions is the main goal of this study.
Highlights
For a long time, until the beginning of the 2000s, the scientific community had been dominated by the optimistic idea that the Internet and the new information and communication technologies (ICT) would bring technological and social progress with their improvement and should certainly contribute to democratization1 and “constitute a threat to authoritarian regimes.”2 Color revolutions and mass protest movements of the 2000s and the early 2010s (The Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) in Ukraine, the Arab spring (2010–2012), protests against electoral fraud in Iran (2009) and Russia (2011–2013) etc.), during which social media played an important mobilizing function, were seen by many scholars as obvious evidence in support of this optimistic point of view.3Alexey Salikov
This article examines the use of Telegram as a means of political communication by the ruling political elite in Russia
While Telegram is illegal at the official level, and attempts have been made to block it in Russia since April 2018, unofficially the Russian authorities continue to actively use Telegram channels for political communication and influencing public opinion as well as for monitoring the mood of the public
Summary
Until the beginning of the 2000s, the scientific community had been dominated by the optimistic idea that the Internet and the new information and communication technologies (ICT) would bring technological and social progress with their improvement and should certainly contribute to democratization and “constitute a threat to authoritarian regimes.” Color revolutions and mass protest movements of the 2000s and the early 2010s (The Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) in Ukraine, the Arab spring (2010–2012), protests against electoral fraud in Iran (2009) and Russia (2011–2013) etc.), during which social media played an important mobilizing function, were seen by many scholars as obvious evidence in support of this optimistic point of view.3Alexey Salikov. At the beginning of the 2000s, more skeptical opinions become widespread, claiming that authoritarian regimes are capable of meeting new technological challenges, and using new communication technologies to strengthen their own power and obtain more control over society.4 These viewpoints were supported by many examples of nondemocratic countries, whose authorities managed to block unwanted Internet sites or even learned to use modern technology for their internal and foreign policy goals.. A very important aspect of political communication is left out of sight, namely the fact that, even in an authoritarian context, the ruling elites may require a communicative platform for external and internal communication This need is hard to satisfy through the official public sphere and traditional media, a new informal platform of communication could be of great help. This paper attempts to fill the gap and examine the use of Telegram by the Russian ruling elite as a channel of political communication
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