Abstract
Technological collaboration coupled with equity participation improves the quality of transacted technology relative to a situation characterised by a pure technology licensing agreement. Such a result is proved in a model of a signalling game with asymmetric information and threat of imitation. Different contractual arrangements involving equity participation with or without up-front fixed fee and/or output-based royalty payments are discussed.
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