Technological Agency in the Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and the US Drone Program

ABSTRACTThis article builds on the recent and growing scholarship on the negative effects of the drone programme. Current literature has shown that the drone programme terrorises the civilian population that it keeps under surveillance. Furthermore, it has articulated the drone programme’s violence as biopolitical and its surveillance as a necropolitical technology of distinction. It is argued in this article that the Orientalist attitudes and logic necessary for drone targeting form the basis for the biopolitical and necropolitical component of the drone programme. This article explores the Orientalism that suffuses the US drone programme in order to juxtapose it with governmental discourses that characterise the drone programme and its surveillance as neutral and humane – demonstrating the gap between government discourses of modernity and the actual drone programme. The necropolitical logic of distinction used for targeting leads to the assimilation of those under the drone’s gaze to a population that can be put to death, leading the drone programme to operate indiscriminately. The biopolitical logic is visible in the US practices, which I argue constitutes terrorism with the corroboration of civilian testimonies.

The United States has conducted armed drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004. While there has been some recent work on Pakistani public opinion about drones, there is very little research on how Pakistan’s media characterize the US drone program. This is an important gap in understanding the determinants of Pakistani popular perceptions of this program. Decades of research has shown that “news framing”, a process by which certain aspects of a complex concept are emphasized in political communications with others played down, influences individual cognition while forming political opinions. In this essay, we address this lacuna by assembling an unprecedented sample of editorials about the drone program from three English newspapers and one Urdu newspaper and analyzing the news frames within them. We next compare the trends in these news frames to public opinion data collected by Pew between the spring of 2009 and 2014. Initially, most Pakistanis were unaware of the drone program, media coverage of the program expanded as drone strikes increased in frequency. While Pakistanis became more cognizant of the US drone strikes, even by 2014 large minorities remained unaware. Pakistani public opinion strongly reflected the top media frames, particularly those that are negative. This is an important finding suggesting that newspaper editorials are a good barometer of Pakistani opinions despite the fact that only information elites rely upon newspapers for political information.

In 2014, three Yemeni claimants filed an administrative complaint against the German government addressing Germany’s role in the US drone programme. Relying on the right to life under the German Basic Law, the claimants argued that German authorities must prevent the US from using its air base in Ramstein, Germany, for purposes of conducting drone strikes that might unlawfully harm the claimants. On 19th March 2019, the Higher Administrative Court of Munster overruled the court of first instance and partly decided in favour of the claimants. In what is a highly interesting and thought-provoking judgment, the Court not only finds strong reasons to suspect that US drone strikes in Yemen, at least partially, violate international law. Even more, it orders the German government to ‘ascertain’ that the US drone strikes conducted via Ramstein Air Base are compatible with international law and, ‘if necessary’, to ‘work towards’ compliance with international law. Remarkable enough, this outcome is not the only reason why the judgment is worth being discussed: It furthermore raises interesting and difficult questions as to the material and territorial reach of fundamental rights under the German Basic Law, their inter-relation with international law, as well as the scope – and limits – of judicial review in matters of international law and foreign affairs.

Eighteen years after the first American drone strike, the US drone program now operates in a record-setting number of countries across the Middle East and Africa. This paper examines the Obama administration’s expansion of the US drone program through the lens of Ontological Security Theory, wherein states fulfill their need for security as a sense of being by engaging in uncertainty-reducing and identity-building international relationships, including dilemmatic conflicts. This paper argues that President Obama and his administration failed to adequately address the drone program’s domestic, constitutional, and international legal brokenness due to an ontological attachment to the morality behind the conduct of drone operations. In their public statements, administration officials rationalized the program as a medical tool eliminating “the cancerous tumor called an al Qaida terrorist” and presented drones as a morally superior alternative to the use of torture and of indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay. As such, the Obama-era drone program existed both as an uncertainty reduction routine vis a vis the dilemmatic conflict of terrorism, as well as a reflexive, identity-building international relationship that established the program as a key element of the ‘forever war’ against al-Qaeda and set the stage for Trump-era program expansion. As this expansion proceeds, the program will only become further at odds with America’s long-term rational interests.

The United States has conducted armed drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004. Despite recent work on Pakistani public opinion about drones, there is very little research on how Pakistan’s media characterize the US drone program. This is an important gap in understanding the determinants of Pakistani popular beliefs about this program. Decades of research has shown that “news framing,” a process by which certain aspects of a complex concept are emphasized in political communications while others are played down, influences individual cognition while forming political opinions (Lecheler et al. 2015). In this essay, we address this lacuna by assembling an unprecedented sample of editorials about the drone program from three English newspapers and one Urdu newspaper and analyzing the news frames within them. We next compare the trends in these news frames to public opinion data collected by Pew between the spring of 2009 and 2014. Initially, most Pakistanis were unaware of the drone program, media coverage of the program expanded as drone strikes increased in frequency. While Pakistanis became more cognizant of the U.S. drone strikes, even by 2014 large minorities remained unaware. Pakistani public opinion strongly reflected the top media frames, particularly those that are negative. This is an important finding suggesting that newspaper editorials are a good barometer of Pakistani opinions despite the fact that only information elites rely upon newspapers for political information.

Hayes turns to the work of performing rhetorical cartography in this chapter, beginning a broad, sweeping examination of the US and Western authorized targeted killing program facilitated by drones. Mapping a history of the creation of the drone itself, as well as dominant discourses within US and Western publics about armed drone use in the terror wars, Hayes identifies a number of working conclusions about the rhetoricoviolence of the US drone program. These include an exploration of its governmentality at work in mapping binaries of “good” and “bad” Muslim subjects as well as a mapping of rhetoric from US drone pilots about the functions of the program. All of these interventions keep an eye toward the ways that the US drone program has facilitated the creation of new subject positions within the terror wars.

Objeotive To investigate the target killing effect off Raji cells with anti-CD20scFv-FcCD28/ζ gene chimeric T lymphocytes and the activation of T lymphocytes and further approach the mechanism of gene chimeric T lymphocytes target killing lymphoma cells.Methods The plasmids were transfected into retrovirus-packed PA317 cell lines by liposome.The supernatant wills collected from successfully transfected PA317 cells,then co-cultured with T lymphocytes,screening with G418 800μg/ml for 1 week.T-lymphocytes co-culture was grafted with Rail cell lines.the Bcl-2 of Raij cells were examined at timecourse by FACS.the level of IL-10 and IFN-γ was determined by ELISA.Results The Bcl-2 rate had obviously decreased within 24 h in Raii cells.the decreased amplitude was from 98.43%to 38.45%within 72 h.which is significant higher than that in control group and blank group.We found the IL-10 was 100.30 pg/ml in test group at 72 h,which was lower than that in control group(210.88 pg/ml)and blank group (286.71 pg/ml).At the same time IFN-γ(1487.23 pg/ml)was higher than that of other groups.Conclusion Anti-CD20-mediated T cells target lysis Rail cells does not require CD28 costimulation.T cells can enhanced inhibited the IL-10 secretion of Raji by CD28 and CD3ζ costimulation,and also decrease the Bcl-2 of Raji,thereby it accelerates the target cell lysis.CD28/ζ can completely activate T cell without exogenous B7/CD28 costimulation,which furthermore promote T lymphocyte secretion IFN-γ and can also enhance the targeted killing activity of T lymphocytes to Rail cells. Key words: Lymphoma; T lymphocyte; lmmunotherapy

In the Chap. 8, Hayes solidifies a map of the ways that rhetorical studies expands in useful ways with the incorporation of rhetoricoviolence as a rhetorical category and rhetorical cartography as a method. Embracing a rhetorical circulation model, Hayes then moves on to examine technologies of governance functioning within the US drone program, as well as through other outlets. The chapter concludes with a lengthy set of examinations of resistive subjects within the terror wars, from Rand Paul to creator of drone tracking application Josh Begley to various artists speaking to the rhetoricoviolence within the terror wars and the US drone program. Hayes calls for an awakening in performing additional rhetorical cartographies to best understand transnational empire in the twenty-first century and beyond.

We investigate the impact of the US drone program in Pakistan on insurgent violence. Using details about US-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation and geocoded violence data, we show that the program was associated with monthly reductions of around nine to thirteen insurgent attacks and fifty-one to eighty-six casualties in the area affected by the program. This change was sizable, as in the year before the program, the affected area experienced around twenty-one attacks and one hundred casualties per month. Additional quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that this drop is attributable to the drone program. However, the damage caused in strikes during the program cannot fully account for the reduction. Instead, anticipatory effects induced by the program played a prominent role in subduing violence. These effects stemmed from the insurgents’ perception of the risk of being targeted in drone strikes; their efforts to avoid targeting severely compromised their movement and communication abilities, in addition to eroding within-group trust. These findings contrast with prominent perspectives on air-power, counterinsurgency, and US counterterrorism, suggesting select drone deployments can be an effective tool of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

The volume concludes with an exchange between the authors, directly engaging with the others’ respective argument. In this penultimate chapter, Meisels briefly responds and replies to the arguments raised by Waldron against targeted killing. Meisels emphasizes some points of agreement between the two authors: Their commitment to the right to life and the laws of armed conflicts, and their non-pacifist and non-absolutist position on targeted killing. She reemphasizes their points of disagreement, such as the authors’ very different use of analogies, particularly in determining the normative framework for discussing targeted killing (war/armed conflict), their differing views on possible proliferation of target killing, as well as disagreements over precedents and particular cases.

In recent years, the United States has significantly expanded its use of drone warfare. Experts are divided: some defend drones as a legal, effective way to target terrorists while others suggest drones are inaccurate and contribute to anti-Americanism. In addition, international public opinion differs starkly with Americans largely supportive of the program while publics across the globe condemn it. Suspecting news coverage might play a pivotal role in these differences, the authors explored the framing of the US drone program in American, British, and Arab news coverage. Consistent with research on social identity theory and ethnocentrism in news, they find that US coverage was more likely to frame the policy favorably – emphasizing its legality, strategic value and technological sophistication while downplaying civilian deaths – while British and, to a greater extent, Arab coverage was more critical. The authors discuss how these findings build on existing theory and explore the implications for US drone policy.

The drone debate continues hot and heavy. Critical issues range from the morality of targeting choices and concerns about unintended casualties and anti-Americanism to matters of legal and bureaucratic oversight) These are pressing questions; the United States' use of drones as a weapon of war is on the rise, and other countries are interested in acquiring them. (2) Less often raised are first-order questions, or examinations of first principles. These questions consider the fundamental nature of a concept or a tool. (3) This article poses basic questions about the use of drone as tools of the state. My goal is to spark further analysis of drone as an instrument in the US foreign policy tool kit. I ask how drones compare to other weapons and what they may be able to achieve tactically and strategically, militarily and politically. These are also questions worth considering in the context of how other states' acquisition of armed drones could affect the United States. In addition, I identify major unanswered empirical questions about the outcome of drone strikes. There is still a lack of empirical evidence about the effects of drone strikes, partly due to the secrecy of US drone programs and partly due to their relative novelty. But even without that research, it is possible to consider the utility of drones in attempts to increase US security. Some of these questions may seem to have obvious answers, but for those who suggest there is broad agreement in the public debate on first-order questions and first principles regarding drone strikes, I offer the contrasting positions of The New Yorker editor David Remnick and retired Air Force General Charles Dunlap. Remnick states, We are in the same position now, with drones, that we were with nuclear weapons in 1945. For the moment, we are the only ones with this technology that is going to change the morality, psychology, and strategic thinking of warfare for years to come. Dunlap says, It's not particularly new to use long-range strike. David defeated Goliath with a long-range strike with a missile weapon. At Agincourt, the English bowmen destroyed the flower of the French knighthood with long-range ... and we have had long-range strike bombers for some time. This really is not new conceptually. (4) This article considers the goal of US drone programs to be greater security for the United States and its friends and allies. Caveat: There are analysts thinking about a future of stand-off, plugged-in warfare. I make a more modest effort to consider what drone may achieve in fundamental political terms as a forceful tool of the state. I also bracket issues of morality, legality, budgeting, and bureaucratic oversight. Answering practical questions requires understanding what states can do and want to do with drones, politically and militarily. Investigation into the morality of drone is contingent on what states expect drone to achieve and how those drones are deployed. Striking only targets in the act of mounting an attack on the US homeland, for example, presents different moral questions than so-called signature strikes against unidentified individuals judged to be behaving suspiciously. (5) The first core question is whether drones are a unique weapon and whether they provide distinct advantages or disadvantages over other weapons. I categorize drones as a form of air power based on the following logic and evidence, which I detail expecting disagreement will advance the analysis. Like piloted armed aircraft, armed drones provide information as well as strike capacity. They can achieve a variety of military effects, as other air platforms can. They can kill, disable, support fighters on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny access, observe, and track. Like pilots providing close air support, firing missiles, or dropping bombs, drone operators are expected to respect the laws of war, striking based on clear information, including assessment of potential human costs. …

The threat of recurrence of violence remains a protracted concern in post-conflict contexts. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized North Waziristan: the “Taliban target killing campaign” of civilians. The article argues that the targeted killings in (post-conflict) North Waziristan are a pre-mediated and calculated strategy employed by the militants to create space for their resurgence by silencing dissent through extortion, threats and killing of the locals. Exploring post-conflict violence, the article draws attention to the application of de-securitization in North Waziristan where “silent institutional” de-securitizations (i.e., state silence) are adopted to maintain the post-conflict fragile peace to prevent the risk of slippage into re-securitization. In explicating this, the article contributes by identifying three forms of silences: (i) silencing (by killing), (ii) state silence, and (iii) strategic silence. Doing so also helps to elaborate the function, meaning, and consequence of silence(s) in post-conflict contexts.

Military operations carried out with armed drones call into question not only the international responsibility of the drone-sending State but also the potential international responsibility for complicity of assisting States. Drone strikes are conducted through a complex set of tasks that would not be possible without the military cooperation of partner States. Three main scenarios of partnered drone operations are described, namely lending foreign military bases, providing logistical and technological support and intelligence sharing for targeting purposes. The article explores the issue of State complicity under the lens of Article 16 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The core features of State complicity—the ‘significant contribution element', the ‘mental element' and the ‘opposability element'—are discussed and applied to the three scenarios. The practice of partnered drone operations is extensively analysed, focusing on the assistance provided by Italy, Germany and the Netherlands to the US drone programme. The study concludes that in the cases under consideration, the international responsibility for complicity of assisting States is likely to be entailed, should the action of the assisted State result in an internationally wrongful act.

Vision, visuality, and agency in the US drone program