Abstract
Combining a lab-in-the-field experiment with field data, we study the effect of social preferences on performance in a modified teamwork setting, where the production of a public good serves as basis for incentivized individual performance, but is not a goal in itself. Examples of such modified team settings are knowledge sharing, peer coaching, and cooperative learning—all highly relevant topics for organizations today. As opposed to a standard public good setting, we find that conditional cooperators and their team partners are not more successful in producing the target output. In contrast, selfish individuals tend to perform better individually, without generating negative externalities for their team partners, as measured by the incentivized individual performance.
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