Abstract
In a noncooperative game, a team is a set of players that have identical payoffs. We investigate zero-sum games where a team of several players plays against a single adversary. The team is not regarded as a single player because the team members might not be able to coordinate their actions. In such a game, a certain equilibrium can be selected naturally: theteam-maxmin equilibrium. It assures the team players the best payoff they can hope for, given their inability to coordinate. A team-maxmin equilibrium exists, and in a generic game it is unique.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.
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