Taylor and Rousseau on Republican Freedom and Political Fragmentation

Abstract

ABSTRACT Both Rousseau and Charles Taylor are well-known for their support of positive freedom. However, Taylor criticizes Rousseau’s positive freedom and the general will for inducing the worst form of homogenizing tyranny in the French Revolution. Taylor prefers Tocquevillian republicanism because he claims that Rousseau’s general will fails to acknowledge the fact of pluralism. In this article, I compare Rousseau’s and Taylor’s positions on republicanism and argue that Taylor’s positive freedom is very similar to Rousseau’s. Both argue for an exercise-concept of freedom with moral judgment; both reject atomism and argue for some kind of communitarian self. Although Rousseau’s philosophy has several shortcomings, I claim that Taylor’s criticism of Rousseau’s general will is unwarranted, in view of the fact that the problem of political polarization in contemporary democracies seems to show that Tocquevillian republicanism, which Taylor supports, cannot sustain itself in the long run. I conclude that a slightly revised version of Rousseau’s concept of the general will in terms of collective intentionality can deepen our understanding of the political problems besetting Western democracies and the need to fight against political fragmentation.