Abstract
This fable is designed to demonstrate that merely knowing the structure of two taxes that raise equal amounts of revenue will rarely be sufficient to determine which tax will prove preferable for a specific reference group. Most particularly, it shows that any of the traditional forms of taxation on labor may prove beneficial to the laborers themselves. The taxes considered are lump sum levies collected as money or labor, and proportional and nonproportional taxes on wage earnings. The analysis takes the form of a series of examples yielding counter-intuitive results. An epilogue discusses simulations and unstable equilibria.
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