Abstract

Do citizens legislate different tax policies than parliaments? We provide quasi-experimental evidence for causal effects of direct democracy. Town meetings (popular assemblies) replace local councils in small German municipalities below a specific population threshold. RD and event study estimates consistently show that direct democracy comes with sizable but selective tax cuts. The burden of property taxes, which apply to all residents, decrease by some 10 to 15 percent under direct democracy. We do not find that business taxes change. Direct democracy allows citizens to design tax policies more individually than voting for a high-tax or low-tax party in elections.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.